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Abstract 
This paper aims to achieve two objectives. First, we demonstrate that with respect to business 
cycle frequency (Burns and Mitchell, 1946), there was a general decrease in the association 
between macroeconomic variables (MV) and housing market variables (HMV) following the 
global financial crisis (GFC). However, there are macro-finance variables that exhibited a 
strong association with the HMV following the GFC. For the medium-term business cycle 
frequency (Comin and Gertler, 2006), we find that while some correlations exhibit the same 
change as the business cycle counterparts, others do not. These “new stylized facts” suggest 
that a reconsideration and refinement of existing “macro-housing” theories would be 
appropriate. We also provide a review of the recent literature, which may enhance our 
understanding of the evolving macro-housing-finance linkage. 
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1. Introduction
As suggested by the title, this chapter attempts to provide an incomplete 
overview of the research that highlights the macroeconomic aspects of the 
housing market.1  It is incomplete because the literature has been constantly 
growing, especially following the global financial crisis (GFC), and hence is 
almost impossible to review completely. Therefore, we would like to apologize 
in advance as some insightful papers may not have been discussed in this chapter, 
not because they are unimportant, but simply because they have been discussed 
in detail elsewhere. For instance, there have been several similar attempts to 
discuss the literature in special issues of academic journals, survey papers, and 
monographs.2  
According to Leung (2004), housing was not included in traditional 
macroeconomics. However, on account of a few path-breaking papers, much has 
changed.3 While prior literature focuses on residential investment and how it 
interacts with other macroeconomic variables such as business investment, gross 
domestic product (GDP), and so on, extant literature quickly expands to cover 
house price, transaction volume, vacancy, and so on.4 As one of the objectives of 
this paper is to provide a general overview of the related research, we re-examine 
1This paper focuses on housing. Related literature covers studies on land markets, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. See Davis and Palumbo (2008), Krainer et al. (2010), Leung and Chen (2006), Liu et al. (2013), 
Ogawa et al. (1996), among others, and the references therein. 
2The list is growing constantly, and it is difficult to provide a “complete list” here. See Bostic and Ellen (2014), 
Davis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2014), Hendershott et al. (2010), Ihlanfeldt and Mayock (2015), Jordà et al. (2016), 
Malpezzi (2017a, b, c), McMillen (2011), Piazzesi and Schneider (2016), Sanders and Van Order (2011), among 
others, and the references therein. 
3See Baxter (1996), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), among others. 
4See Aoki et al. (2004), Chang (2000), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and Minetti 
(2008), Jin and Zeng (2004), Kan et al. (2004), Kwong and Leung (2000), Leung (1999, 2003, 2014), Leung and 
Feng (2005), Leung et al. (2002a, b), Lin et al. (2004), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), Tse and Leung (2002), 
among others, and the references therein. 
3 
 
some “stylized facts” of how the macroeconomic variables (MV) on the one hand, 
and housing market variables (HMV), on the other hand, are correlated. 
Hopefully, this will inspire new research on macro-housing. Again, for the sake 
of inspiring new research, we then selectively review some of the recent literature. 
In the final section, we conclude this paper. 
 
2. Stylized Facts 
  2.1. Business Cycle Frequency 
We first focus on the business cycle frequency. To establish some “stylized 
facts” on the “macro aspects of housing,” we follow the approach of Cooley and 
Prescott (1995), which provides some (unconditional) correlations between MV 
and HMV in the United States, where most macroeconomic research is done.5 
Clearly, studies on the macroeconomic aspects of housing have used data from 
different countries.6 Here, we use data from the United States because (1) they 
are the most accessible, and (2) most “macroeconomic research” uses U.S. data 
and hence our use of the same data will facilitate comparison. Our list of HMV 
includes not only the price index (which is the focus of most research), but also 
the number of new houses sold, the vacancy rate, and the residential investment. 
Owing to the well-known debate on the potential bias with respect to appraisals, 
we use the transaction-based house price index.7 Hence, we trade off the length 
                                                       
5For an introduction to the U.S. housing market, see Green and Malpezzi (2003), among others. For a comparison 
of the U.S. mortgage system with that in other countries, see Green (2014), Green and Wachter (2005), Cho (2007, 
2009), among others. 
6The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Bardhan et al. (2004, 2008, 2012), Ben-Shafar et al. (2008), 
Cesa‐Bianchi et al. (2015), Chang and Chen (2012), Chao and Yu (2015), Cheung et al. (2017), Edelstein and Kim 
(2004), Ho et al. (2008), Kawaguchi (2009), Kim (2012), Leung (2017), Leung and Chen (2017), Leung and 
Quigley (2007), Leung and Tang (2012), Lum (2012), Malpezzi and Sa-Aadu (1996), Mera and Renaud (2000), 
Seek et al. (2014), Seko et al. (2012), Tirtiroglu (2012), Tiwari (2001), among others, and the references therein.  
7The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Gau and Wang (1991), Geltner (1991), Geltner et al. (2003), 
among others.  
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of the time series data for a less controversial interpretation of the results. Except 
for a few variables such as the consumer price index (CPI) and federal funds rate 
(FFR), all of the other variables are represented in real terms.  
Following Burns and Mitchell (1946) and most subsequent research on 
business cycles, this section focuses on the “cyclical components,” i.e., 
components with periodicity between 6 and 32 quarters. As many of the variables 
are non-stationary, moments (including correlations) are not well defined. The 
variables need to be detrended, and we therefore use the following procedures. 
First, we use the band-pass filter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) 
to extract the “cyclical components.” 8  Second, we not only report those 
correlations, but also test whether they are statistically significant or not. Third, 
we compare two sampling periods: (1) from 1991 to 2006, which will be referred 
to as the pre-crisis sub-sample (PCSS), and (2) from 1991 to 2017Q3, which will 
be referred to as the full sample (FS). Some authors argue that there has been a 
“structural change” following the GFC. We therefore compute the correlations in 
both sampling periods and examine whether there are indeed some important 
differences. There is one technical issue here. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
demonstrate that if the volatility of a variable increases over time, the measured 
correlation could be biased. We mitigate this concern by following Stock and 
Watson (2002) to first standardize the volatility of all variables, and then compute 
the correlations among different variables. We explain the details in the appendix.  
                                                       
8See Baxter (1991, 1994), Canova (1998), among others, who show that “stylized facts” are not robust to different 
filtering methods and the first-difference filter exaggerates the high-frequency components. Burnside (1998) 
shows that “stylized facts” are indeed robust if one turns to the frequency domain. Cogley and Nason (1995), King 
and Rebelo (1993) show that the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter creates spurious serial correlations and distorts 
“stylized facts.” Baxter and King (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) show that the band-pass filter, 
which builds on some results in the frequency domain, is statistically “superior” to the commonly used HP filter. 
In the present context, the “full sample” includes the GFC, which could be a high-frequency event for some data 
series, and at the same time a lasting event for other series. As we do not know a priori in which series the GFC 
is short-lived, and in which it is a long-lasting event, it is natural to use the band-pass filter to ensure that the 
corresponding periodicities of the components that we extract are precise.   
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Table 1 Panel A shows the correlations (contemporaneous, one-period-lead, 
and one-period-lag) among the housing market variables and the more 
conventional macroeconomic variables. Table 1 Panel B shows the counterparts 
among the housing market variables and the macro-finance variables. The idea is 
to investigate whether some macroeconomic variables may be “leading” the 
housing market variables, or vice versa.9  
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Several observations are in order. First, most correlations are significant, 
suggesting that the (aggregate) housing market variables and the macroeconomic 
variables are indeed closely related. In other words, the “macro-housing” 
literature is justified. Second, while most correlations in the two sampling periods 
are similar, there are cases with some noticeable differences. For instance, in the 
PCSS, the real GDP, and vacancy rate of the for-sale housing were significantly 
and negatively correlated. The unemployment rate and house prices were also 
significantly and negatively correlated. The idea is simple. When the economy 
receives a positive shock, firms hire more labor and people are more willing to 
purchase housing units, resulting in an increase in the aggregate output and a 
decrease in the unemployment rate. At the same time, the house prices increase 
and the vacancy rate of the for-sale housing market decreases. However, for the 
full-sample, such intuitive correlations disappear. Clearly, these are simple 
correlations and they provide no proof of causality. Nevertheless, they suggest 
perhaps that there is a change in the dynamics between the macroeconomy and 
                                                       
9Clearly, the treatment here is heuristic. For further treatment of the subject see Berge (2015), Camacho and Perez-
Quiros (2002), among others, and the references therein.  
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the housing market, which may be related to the “jobless recovery” following the 
GFC in the sense that the aggregate GDP rebounds much faster than the labor 
market. Moreover, the slow recovery of the labor market also affects the recovery 
of the housing market.10 This is discussed in depth later.  
Another set of important correlations is related to the level of the CPI. This 
is clearly important because many undergraduate students were taught that the 
CPI and inflation are at the core of macroeconomics.11 Moreover, the mandate 
of several central banks is tied to some sort of “price stability.” Therefore, we 
believe that it is important to examine the correlations between the CPI on the 
one hand, and the housing variables on the other hand. Table 1 Panel A shows that 
before the GFC, the CPI was positively correlated to house prices. However, the 
statistical significance disappears when we consider the full sample, suggesting 
that the relationship between the CPI and house prices has also “weakened” after 
the GFC. Moreover, the correlations between the CPI on the one hand and other 
housing variables on the other hand also tend to be insignificant, which is 
consistent with the recent literature that suggests that the relationship between the 
inflation rate and other macroeconomic variables may have changed after the 
GFC.12  
 
The fourth row of Table 1 Panel A also shows that the real private non-
residential fixed investment had a strong positive correlation with real house price, 
and a negative correlation with the for-sale housing vacancy rate in the PCSS. 
This intuition is simple to explain. When the economy is booming, more 
                                                       
10For a general discussion on recovery and labor markets, see Christiano et al. (2015, 2016), among others. For a 
discussion on the slow recovery and the housing markets, see Garriga and Hedlund (2017), Hedlund (2016 a, b), 
Luo (2017), among others, and the references therein. 
11For instance, see Hubbard and O’Brien (2014). See also Doepke and Schneider (2006), among others. 
12The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Del Negro et al. (2015), Gilchrist et al. (2017), Hall (2011), 
King and Watson (2012), among others. 
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investment is made for non-residential fixed assets. At the same time, the demand 
for housing increases and hence house prices increase and the vacancy rate 
decreases, which explains the observed correlations. Conversely, once we include 
the post-crisis years, the correlation between non-residential fixed investment and 
house prices weaken, and the correlation between the non-residential fixed 
investment and the for-sale housing vacancy rate becomes insignificant. Similarly, 
while non-residential fixed investment and residential investment are evidently 
correlated, 13  the correlations seem to weaken after the GFC. In fact, the 
correlation between the prior period of non-residential investment and the current 
period of residential investment was around 0.4 before the GFC. The same 
correlation drops to about 0.15 and becomes statistically insignificant in the full 
sample. Again, we observe a “weakening” of the link between the macroeconomy 
and the housing market. 
 
The same “weakening” may also be exhibited in consumption. The “wealth 
effect of consumption” is being discussed even in undergraduate macroeconomic 
textbooks. There is extensive literature on whether (and how) fluctuations in 
housing wealth and stock market wealth affects consumption.14 Table 1 Panel A 
displays many correlations between the aggregate private consumption on the one 
hand, and the housing market variables on the other hand. The correlations 
between consumption and house price ranged from 0.66 to 0.73 before the GFC. 
However, when we consider the full sample, those correlations drop to between 
0.41 and 0.58. The intuitive correlations between consumption and the vacancy 
                                                       
13It has been studied extensively. See Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), Chang (2000), Chen and Liao (2017), 
among others, and the references therein. 
14The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Bostic et al. (2009), Calomiris et al. (2009), Carroll et al. 
(2011), Case et al. (2005), Gerardi et al. (2018), Kaplan et al. (2016), Zhou and Carroll (2012), among others, and 
the references therein. 
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rate are negative and statistically significant. When the economy booms, people 
consume more and are simultaneously more willing to buy a house, and hence 
the vacancy rate drops. However, those correlations become insignificant when 
we consider the full sample. Again, it only adds to the evidence that the 
correlations between housing market variables and macroeconomic variables 
weakened after the GFC. 
 
Similarly, before the GFC, the correlations between the trade surplus and 
house prices were high, and were around -0.77.15 At the same time, the trade 
surplus (in real terms) is positively related to the vacancy rate of for-sale housing. 
The intuition here is also simple to explain. When the trade account has a surplus, 
the capital account is in deficit, suggesting that there is an outflow of capital. With 
an outflow of capital, it is natural to expect that house prices fall and the vacancy 
rate of housing increases.16 However, when the years following the GFC are 
included, the correlations between trade surplus and house prices drop to between 
-0.30 and -0.48. The correlations between the trade surplus and the vacancy rate 
of for-sale housing are also significantly reduced, and some even become 
statistically insignificant. 
Table 1 Panel B shows the correlations between some “macro-finance” 
variables on the one hand, and the housing market variables on the other hand. 
We begin with the Federal Fund Rate (FFR), which is often considered as the 
“policy rate,” an indicator of the “tightness” of the monetary policy. The first row 
presents the results for the nominal FFR and the second row presents the 
counterpart for the real FFR, which is defined as the difference between the 
                                                       
15 There are studies relating the housing market to international trade, both theoretically and empirically. See 
Bardhan et al. (2004), Corrigan (2017), Leung (2001), Leung et al. (2013), among others. 
16See Aizenman and Jinjarak (2009), Tomura (2010), among others, and the references therein for related analysis. 
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nominal FFR and the inflation rate (based on the CPI). Note that after the GFC, 
the Federal Reserve cuts the nominal interest rate to almost zero and many authors 
argue that the “zero lower bound” (ZLB) introduces distortions in both parameter 
estimation as well as welfare cost. To formally study the ZLB, however, is a very 
involved process.17 Therefore, we introduce the real FFR instead, which does not 
have a ZLB for comparison. Comparing the first and second rows of Table 1 Panel 
B, it is evident that the results related to the nominal and real FFR are usually 
similar, which is perhaps because the CPI inflation rate is dominated by high-
frequency components. As the Christiano and Fitzgerald band-pass filter 
accurately extracts only the business cycle components (i.e., components with 
periodicity between 6 and 32 quarters), the impact of inflation on the FFR is 
minimal. Clearly, the FFR is positively correlated to the real house price, and only 
weakly correlated with other housing market variables. This may sound counter-
intuitive because a higher interest rate should discourage people from investing. 
However, if we take the endogeneity of the FFR into consideration, the correlation 
between the FFR and house prices can be understood better. Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2017) explain this well:18  
“…The Federal Reserve lowered interest rates aggressively in 2008 as 
evidence mounted that the economy was heading for a severe downturn. Suppose 
one sought to use this variation in monetary policy to estimate the effect of 
monetary policy on the economy by estimating an OLS regression of the change 
in output on the change in interest rates. Doing this might lead one to conclude 
that reductions in interest rates lead to decreases in output. Would this constitute 
convincing evidence on the effects of monetary policy? Of course not. The reason 
                                                       
17The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Gust et al. (2017), Hirose and Inoue (2016), Wu and Xia 
(2016), among others.  
18See Sims (2010, 2012), among others. 
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the Fed was lowering interest rates was that other factors—such as rapidly falling 
home prices and their effects on the balance sheets of households, firms, and 
banks—were negatively affecting the economy. In a simple OLS regression, these 
other factors would confound the effects of the change in monetary policy. This 
approach would, therefore, uncover not the pure effect of the interest rate 
reduction, but rather, the combined effect of the interest rate reduction and the 
adverse macroeconomic factors that led the Fed to undertake it.” 
 
In the literature, therefore, researchers have used other interest rates, as 
proxies of the credit market conditions, and examine the co-movements of those 
interest rates and the housing market variables.19 Table 1 Panel B also shows how 
these interest rates are related to housing market variables. For instance, clearly 
the term spread, which is the difference between the long-term and short-term 
interest rate, is negatively correlated with house prices and residential investment. 
Interestingly, while the correlations between the macroeconomic variables on the 
one hand and the housing market variables, on the other hand, weakened after the 
GFC, the correlation between the term spread and the residential investment 
became stronger. Furthermore, the correlations between the term spread and the 
number of new houses sold are either enforced or turning from statistically 
insignificant to negatively significant.  
 
The Treasury-EuroDollar rate (TED) spread is the difference between a 
measure of the interbank interest rate and the risk-free rate. An increase in TED 
is often interpreted as an increase in the cost of external funds for financial 
                                                       
19The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Chang et al. (2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2016), Chen and Wang 
(2007, 2008), Jin et al. (2012), Malpezzi (2017a, c), Yavuz (2014), among others, and the references therein. 
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intermediaries. Not surprisingly, it is not significantly related to either the house 
price or the residential investment before the GFC. However, when we examine 
the same correlation for the full sample, the TED spread is negatively correlated 
with both house prices and the residential investment. In fact, it seems to be 
“leading” both house prices and the residential investment. The correlations 
between the TED spread and the number of new houses sold are also strengthened 
after the GFC. Such changes may be related to two factors: (1) the manner in 
which the Federal Reserve Bank implements the monetary policy,20 and (2) the 
adoption of the unconventional monetary policy (UMP) since the GFC. Recent 
research confirms that the UMP impacts the financial institutions and the 
economy through different channels.21 Table 1 Panel B simply confirms that 
research in the context of the housing market. 
 
The case for the external finance premium (EFP) is interesting. The EFP is 
the difference between the prime bank lending rate and the 3-month Treasury-bill 
(T-bill) rate. An increase in EFP is often interpreted as an increase in the cost of 
external funds for non-financial firms, and it has been used in many types of 
research.22 Table 1 Panel B shows that its correlation with the house price is 
negative. On the other hand, it had a positive and significant correlation with the 
vacancy rate before the GFC. The idea is that when the credit market is tight, it is 
difficult for both firms and households to obtain credit. And when households 
cannot obtain credit, many of them cannot purchase homes. Hence, both the EFP 
and the vacancy rate of the for-sale housing increase, and the house prices 
                                                       
20See Frost et al. (2015), Ihrig et al. (2015), among others. 
21The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Bhattarai and Neely (2016), Chodorow-Reich (2014), Gertler 
and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), among others, and the references therein. 
22See Bernanke and Gertler (1995), Bernanke et al. (1999), among others. Jin et al. (2012) modify the framework 
of Bernanke et al. (1999) and study how the EFP and housing price can interact. 
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decrease. When we consider the full sample, i.e., when the GFC and the 
subsequent years are taken into consideration, the correlations between the EFP 
and the vacancy rate of for-sale housing weaken, and some even become 
statistically insignificant. At the same time, the negative correlation between the 
EFP and house prices is “strengthened” in the sense that it becomes more negative. 
 
There is extensive literature on the co-movement between the housing market 
and the stock market.23 Table 1 Panel B shows that the correlations between the 
house price and stock price (measured by the S&P 500 index) are indeed positive 
and statistically significant, both before and after the GFC. There is a subtle 
difference here. In the PCSS, the correlation between the lagged stock price of 
one period and the house prices of the current period is larger than the 
contemporaneous correlation, which in turn is larger than the correlation between 
the stock price of one period ahead and the house prices of the current period, 
suggesting that the stock price is somewhat leading the house price. As we 
consider the full sample, i.e., including the years after the GFC, we find the 
reverse pattern, suggesting that the stock price is somewhat lagging the house 
price. Clearly, a formal testing for leading versus a lagging relationship would 
need more sophisticated tests and perhaps a longer time series. Nevertheless, this 
suggests a possible change in the relationship between the stock and housing 
markets. At the same time, as we compare the correlations between the stock price 
on the one hand, and the other HMV on the other hand (including the number of 
new houses sold, the vacancy rate of for-sale housing, and the private residential 
fixed investment), we see a “general weakening” of the relationship. For instance, 
                                                       
23The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Chang et al. (2012, 2013, 2016), Chu (2010), Davis and Martin 
(2009), Kwan et al. (2015), Leung (2007), Piazzesi et al. (2007), Quan and Titman (1999), among others, and the 
references therein. 
13 
 
the relationship between the stock price and the number of new houses sold 
remain positive, but the numerical values drop in the full sample. Some 
correlations between the stock price and the housing vacancy rate turn from 
negative and significant to insignificant. The correlations between the stock price 
and the residential investment remain positive but are numerically much smaller. 
Clearly, it is pre-mature to conclude a “de-coupling” between the stock market 
and housing market. At the same time, it seems important to examine whether 
and how the relationship between the stock and housing market has changed after 
the GFC.  
 
  2.2. Medium Cycle Frequency 
 
Thus far, we have focused on business cycle frequency, which many 
macroeconomic studies have also focused on. However, some authors propose 
that we should focus on the “longer run.”24 Here, we follow Comin and Gertler 
(2006) to study components with periodicity between 32 and 80 quarters, which 
we label as “medium-run components.” We are aware that our sampling period is 
relatively short and hence the estimate of the medium cycles may not be as 
accurate as it should be. Constrained by the unavailability of data, we can only 
recognize the limitations and proceed nevertheless. To facilitate the comparison, 
we repeat the exercise in the previous section with the “medium-run components.” 
The results are reported in Table 2, which are identical to those in Table 1, except 
that the correlations are now correlations among medium-run components rather 
than cyclical components. As in the case of cyclical components, most 
                                                       
24See Drehmann et al. (2012), among others. Borio (2014, p.183) claims “the financial cycle has a much lower 
frequency than the traditional business cycle…”  
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correlations are statistically significant, suggesting that the macroeconomy and 
the housing market are closely related in the medium run as well. At the same 
time, we do observe some difference between the PCSS and the full sample, and 
focus our discussion on those differences. 
 
Given the structure, we begin with the first row in Table 2 Panel A, the 
correlations between the GDP on the one hand, and housing market variables on 
the other hand. Interestingly, while the correlations between GDP and housing 
market variables are weakened in the business cycle frequency, they are 
strengthened in the medium-cycle frequency. For instance, the correlations 
between the cyclical components of GDP and the vacancy rate of a for-sale 
housing turn from negative and significant to insignificant, while the medium-
cycle counterparts turn from mostly insignificant to mostly negative and 
significant. Undoubtedly, this is a challenge for future research to construct a 
theoretical model to explain these changes.25 
 
Such a challenge is not limited to the relationship between GDP and housing 
market variables. As we study the second row of Table 2 Panel A, we find that the 
correlations between the medium-run components of the unemployment rate and 
house price are strengthened, while the counterparts in cyclical components are 
weakened. Moreover, while the correlations between the cyclical component of 
the unemployment rate and the number of new houses sold are mostly 
insignificant, they are negative and significant in the medium-run component. 
Furthermore, the correlations are strengthened after the GFC. While the 
                                                       
25Research efforts have been devoted to explaining the heterogeneous “stylized facts” across different frequencies. 
See Pancrazi (2015), who show how a change in the persistence of the exogenous shocks can generate 
“heterogeneous great moderation,” among others.  
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correlations between the cyclical components of the unemployment rate and the 
vacancy rate of for-sale housing are mostly negative in the full sample, the 
counterparts in the medium-run components are mostly positive in the full sample, 
which seems to be more intuitive. When the economy is hit by a bad shock, the 
unemployment rate increases and hence the demand for housing drops, which in 
turn leads to an increase in the vacancy rate of housing.  
 
Note that there are also situations in which patterns in cyclical components 
and medium-run components are consistent. For instance, the third row of Table 
2 Panel A shows that the correlations between the medium-run components of 
CPI and (real) house price are negative and significant, but the correlations are 
obviously weakened in the full sample. This is in line with the finding in the 
cyclical component that the positive correlation between the two variables turn 
from positive and significant to mostly insignificant. In fact, the correlations 
between the medium-run components of CPI and other housing market variables 
(the number of new houses sold, a vacancy rate of for-sale housing, and private 
residential fixed investment) are dramatically weakened in the full sample. Thus, 
it is in line with the idea that changes in nominal variables have limited long-run 
impact on real variables.26  
  The case for private non-residential fixed investment also poses a 
challenge. It is well known that the non-residential fixed investment and the 
residential counterparts are positively correlated with business cycle frequency.27 
Table 2 Panel A reveals that in fact, the counterpart in medium-cycle frequency 
is negatively correlated before the GFC. It, however, turns to be positive and 
                                                       
26  Clearly, the treatment here is heuristic. The literature on “money neutrality” is too large to be discussed here. 
See King and Watson (1997), Vaona, A. (2015), among others, and the references therein. 
27See Baxter (1996), Chang (2000), Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991), among others, and the references therein. 
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significant in the full sample. Similarly, the correlations between the medium-run 
components of the non-residential investment and house price are negative before 
the GFC and become positive and significant in the full sample. This is in contrast 
to the case of cyclical components, which remain positive and significant in the 
PCSS and the full sample.  
 
The correlations between the medium-run components of trade surplus and 
housing prices somewhat differ from the cyclical component counterpart. In the 
case of cyclical components, the correlations between the trade surplus are 
reduced from the -0.76 to -0.78 range to the -0.30 to -0.48 range as we extend 
from the PCSS to the full sample. In the case of medium-run components, 
however, the correlations are always in between -0.90 and -0.99, suggesting that 
in real terms, the international capital flow and house prices are more correlated 
in the medium run than in the business cycle frequency. In fact, the correlations 
between the trade surplus on the one hand, and the number of new houses sold 
and the private residential fixed investment, on the other hand, display a similar 
degree of co-movements. Thus, even for a large country like the United States, 
where net exports constitute around 10% of the GDP, international capital flows 
are important for the housing market. Future research may further explore this 
dimension. 
 
Table 2 Panel B exhibits the correlations between the medium-run 
components of the macro-finance variables on the one hand, and housing market 
variables on the other hand. Its format closely follows that of Table 1 Panel A, 
where the counterpart of the business cycle components is displayed. The first 
row shows the correlation between the nominal FFR and the housing market 
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variables. Its “pattern” dramatically differs from the counterparts of the cyclical 
components. For instance, the correlations between the medium-run component 
of the nominal FFR and the house price are statistically significant, yet 
numerically small (in the range of 0.17 to 0.33 in the full sample). In contrast, in 
the case of cyclical components, the correlations are in the range of 0.55 to 0.69, 
and they are statistically significant. The correlations between the medium-run 
components of the nominal FFR and the vacancy rate of for-sale housing are in 
the range of 0.84 to 0.93 in the PCSS, and in the range of 0.57 to 0.70 in the full 
sample. Although the correlations are “weakened,” they remain statistically 
significant. On the other hand, the cyclical counterpart is mostly insignificant. At 
the same time, the correlations between the medium-run components of the 
nominal FFR and private residential fixed investment become marginally 
significant or even insignificant in the full sample. The cyclical component 
counterparts are also statistically significant at the 1% level and in the range of 
0.33 to 0.60. In other words, the co-movements between the nominal FFR and the 
housing market are very different in the business cycle frequency and in the 
medium cycles.  
 
In the previous section, we have also shown in the business cycle frequency, 
the correlations between nominal FFR and housing market variables, and those 
between the real FFR and housing market variables are similar. In the medium 
run, however, this is not always the case. For instance, the second row of the Table 
2 Panel B shows that the correlations between the real FFR and real house price 
are negative and significant before the GFC. When we consider the full sample, 
those correlations become numerically small and statistically insignificant. The 
counterpart in the business cycle frequency is always positive and significant, 
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whether in the PCSS or in the full sample. In other cases, the behavior of the 
medium-run components of nominal and real FFR seem to be similar. Both the 
nominal and real FFR are positively correlated with the vacancy rate of the for-
sale housing in the medium run, while almost un-correlated with the vacancy rate 
in the business cycle frequency. Both the nominal and real FFR are statistically 
correlated with the number of new houses sold before the GFC in the medium run 
and then become almost uncorrelated in the full sample, while they are typically 
uncorrelated with the number of new houses sold in the business cycle frequency. 
As monetary research constitutes a significant part of the macroeconomic 
research, accounting for these differences may be important for future modeling 
development.  
 
The third row of the Table 2 Panel B shows how the term spread correlates 
with the housing market variables. It is interesting to note that before the GFC, 
the medium-run term spread is only weakly correlated with the house price in the 
PCSS. It becomes statistically correlated with the house price in the full sample. 
Yet the numerical values are somewhat small, in the range of -0.18 to -0.25, which 
is in sharp contrast to the case of business cycle frequency. The correlations 
between the cyclical components of term spread and house price are always 
between -0.61 and -0.70, and they are statistically significant. The cyclical 
component of the term spread is also negatively correlated with the number of 
new houses sold in the full sample, with correlations between -0.20 and -0.40. In 
the medium run, however, the two variables are more or less uncorrelated.  
 
Similarly, a dramatic difference is observed in the TED spread. The fourth 
row of Table 2 Panel B clearly shows that the correlations between the medium-
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run components of the TED spread and house price are negative and significant 
before the GFC and become almost insignificant in the full sample. In the cyclical 
component counterpart, while the two variables are not correlated before the GFC, 
they become negatively and significantly correlated in the full sample. Moreover, 
the medium-run components of the TED spread and the vacancy rate of the for-
sale housing are significantly correlated. The correlations range between 0.75 and 
0.80, whether in the PCSS, or during the full sample. The cyclical components of 
the same pair of variables are almost uncorrelated.  
 
While the relationships between the EFP and housing market variables are 
similar in the business cycle frequency and in the medium-cycle frequency, the 
relationships between the stock price (measured by the S&P 500 index, in real 
terms) and housing market variables are very different in the two frequencies. 
Recall from Table 1 Panel B that the cyclical components of the stock price and 
house price are positively (and significantly) correlated, both before the GFC and 
in the full sample. Table 2 Panel B, however, shows that the medium-cycle 
components of the same pair of variables are negatively and significantly 
correlated before the GFC, with correlations between -0.36 and -0.42. In the full 
sample, the two asset prices become uncorrelated. Similarly, the cyclical 
components of the stock price and the number of new houses sold are positively 
and significantly correlated, both before the GFC and in the full sample. However, 
the medium-cycle components of the same pair of variables are negatively and 
significantly correlated before the GFC, with correlations between -0.23 and -
0.27. In the full sample, the stock price and number of new houses sold become 
positively correlated. The correlations are statistically significant, but 
economically weak, in the range of 0.25 to 0.26. The cyclical components of the 
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stock price and private residential investment is positively and significantly 
correlated, both before the GFC and in the full sample. The correlations are 0.55 
or above. However, the medium-cycle components of the same pair of variables 
are negatively and significantly correlated before the GFC, with correlations 
between -0.31 and -0.33. In the full sample, the stock price and residential 
investment become positively correlated. The correlations are statistically 
significant, but economically weak, in the range of 0.22 to 0.23.  
 
 
 
  2.3. A Summary 
Here we provide a quick summary. For the business cycle frequency (or 
“cyclical components,” i.e., components with periodicity between 6 and 32 
quarters), while macroeconomic variables and housing market variables are 
correlated in many dimensions, we find that some “stylized facts” indeed change 
after the GFC. More specifically, many intuitive correlations between MV on the 
one hand and HMV, on the other hand, are weakened. At the same time, several 
measures of interest rates have their correlations with HMV strengthened. These 
changes may be important because we may have built theoretical models to 
explain the “old stylized facts,” and this is how our “intuitions” are formed. The 
revision of those stylized facts may be a call for refining some existing models of 
macro-housing. Hopefully, we can see more refined models that are consistent 
with both the “stylized facts” for the period before the GFC, as well as the period 
after. 28  For the medium-cycle frequency, some correlations follow changes 
similar to their counterparts in business cycle frequency, while others are very 
                                                       
28See Benes et al. (2014), Del Negro et al. (2013, 2015), Funke et al. (2017), Guerrieri et al. (2015), among others, 
for related efforts. 
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different. Apparently, existing models are relatively silent on these differences, 
which reinforces the call for more serious theoretical modeling efforts. 
   
Now we qualify our results in the following ways. First, all of these 
correlations are unconditional and bilateral. Although they are statistically 
significant, they do not indicate the direction of causality. It is possible that the 
correlations are driven by some “third factor.” While some of the unconditional 
correlations are insignificant, it is possible that the conditional counterpart of 
these correlations are significant, i.e., when some third variable is being held 
constant. In addition, if some variables exhibit non-linear dynamics such as 
regime-switching or contain a “bubble” component, the unconditional 
correlations may not provide us with the full picture.29 Moreover, all of these 
correlations are based on aggregate data. Recent research, on the other hand, tends 
to use micro-data. In the next section, we will, therefore, review some of those 
works. 
 
3. A Review of Selected Literatures 
 
   Although recent years have witnessed a rapid growth in the macro-housing 
literature, this section only provides a review of a subset of this literature. The 
order and topics selected are somehow arbitrary. Our only objective is to provide 
an (incomplete) review that will facilitate the exchange of ideas and perhaps 
encourage even more research in this area. 
 
                                                       
29The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Chang et al. (2011, 2012, 2013, 2016), Chen et al. (2006, 2010, 
2015), Chen and Leung (2008), Deng et al. (2017), Phillips et al. (2015a, b), Yiu et al. (2013), among others, and 
the reference therein. 
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  3.1. Bankruptcy and Mortgage Contract 
 
In their Mayekawa Lecture presented at the Bank of Japan, Goodhart and 
Tsomocos (2011) argue the following: “What is the main limitation of much 
macroeconomic theory, among the failings pointed out by William R. White at 
the 2010 Mayekawa Lectures? We argue that the main deficiency is a failure to 
incorporate the possibility of default, including that of banks, into the core of the 
analysis….” Recent research efforts have indeed addressed such a concern. In 
particular, authors have introduced heterogeneity in banks, firms, households, and 
their potential defaults in macroeconomics.30 In the context of macro-housing, it 
is natural to consider mortgage default. It follows that one should first introduce 
mortgage debt in macro models. Chambers et al. (2009a, b, c), among others, 
propose overlapping generation models (OGM) with stochastic labor income and 
endogenous tenure choice (to rent or to own).31 They also compare different types 
of mortgage contracts and study their implications in equilibrium. Their models 
can match some stylized facts of the U.S. aggregate economy and the housing 
market, including the homeownership rates across different age groups. 
Iacoviello and Pavan (2013) study an OGM with aggregate shock and match some 
stylized facts of housing and mortgage debt over the business cycles.  
 
Carlos Hatchondo et al. (2015), among others, go one step further by 
building a model in which the house prices are characterized by a stochastic 
                                                       
30The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Athreya et al. (2012, 2015, 2017), Chatterjee et al. (2007), 
Corbae and D’Erasmo (2017), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Gertler et al. (2015), Khan et al. (2014), Krueger et 
al. (2016), among others, and the references therein. 
31There are many related studies on mortgage contract and/or homeownership. See Amior and Halket (2014), 
Anagnostopoulos et al. (2013), Fisher and Gervais (2011), Ghent (2012), Kydland et al. (2016), Luo (2017), 
Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2014), Ríos-Rull and Sánchez-Marcos (2008), Sun and Tsang (2016), Yao (2018), among 
others, and the references therein. 
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process and allow agents to default the mortgage loan. This step significantly 
complicates the analysis. For instance, in the case of recourse mortgage, if a 
borrower fails to make the scheduled mortgage payment, the lender has the right 
to seize the other liquid assets of the borrower. Hence, the saving decision is 
related to the default decision and hence the dynamic optimization problem 
involves interacting continuous and discrete choices, and some conventional 
methods of modeling mortgage contract may not be suitable in this context.32 
Based on their structural model, they conduct counter-factual experiments and 
find that combining recourse mortgage and a loan-to-value (LTV) ratio limit may 
mitigate the sharp increase in the default rate after a sharp decline in house prices. 
Corbae and Quintin (2015) study a model in which agents stochastically age over 
time. The house price is also exogenous. The agents can choose a high or low 
level of down payment on the mortgage contract. Based on their structural model, 
they conclude that high-leverage loans originating before the financial crisis are 
responsible for the high foreclosure rate following the crisis. Apparently, both 
Carlos Hatchondo et al. (2015) and Corbae and Quintin (2015) point to the policy 
recommendation that some minimum level of down payment may mitigate the 
severity of the crisis. Mitman (2016) also builds a dynamic model with an 
exogenous house price process, an endogenous tenure choice, different ways of 
“filing bankruptcy” (Chapter 7 or Chapter 13), and foreclosure that may or may 
not happen.33 He also exploits the cross-state difference in the default laws in his 
modeling and calibration, and subsequently examines two policies, namely, the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), which 
                                                       
32Some previous studies model a mortgage contract as a staggered contract, following Taylor (1980) and others 
model a mortgage contract as a down payment constraint, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). There is related 
literature on optimal mortgage contract design, which is typically partial equilibrium and theoretical in nature. 
See Pikorski and Seru (2018), among others, for a review of that literature. 
33See Karsten et al. (2013), Lambertini et al. (2017), among others, for a related analysis. 
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was imposed in 2005, and the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), 
which was imposed in 2009. He finds that the BAPCPA reform significantly 
reduces the number of bankruptcy cases, and simultaneously leads to a significant 
increase in foreclosures during the Great Recession. He also finds that the HARP 
program enables households with high LTV to refinance their mortgages, thereby 
leading to significant welfare gains to those households.34  
Justiniano et al. (2013, 2015a, b, 2016), among others, argue that it may be 
important to distinguish borrowing constraint from lending constraint. In their 
models, borrowing constraint is the same as the collateral constraint imposed by 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), as the value of debt cannot exceed the product of an 
exogenously imposed parameter ߠ and the total value of the collateral. In this 
case, a “loosening” of a borrowing standard refers to an increase in the value of 
ߠ, capturing the idea that the same value of collateral can now “support” a larger 
amount of borrowing at the individual level. The lending constraint, on the other 
hand, refers to an upper bound on the total amount of mortgage lending that 
households can obtain. Justiniano et al. (2015a) show in their appendix B that the 
lending constraint is equivalent to a leverage constraint faced by financial 
intermediaries. They find that it is indeed the lending constraint, rather than the 
widely used borrowing constraint, that is more consistent with the four stylized 
facts related to the Great Recession: (1) house prices rise dramatically between 
2000 and 2006, (2) household mortgage debt also increases dramatically during 
the same period, (3) mortgage debt and house price increase in parallel, and (4) 
real mortgage interest rates decline during that period. They illustrate their 
mechanism with two types of agents and an endogenous house price.35 However, 
                                                       
34See also Kaplan and Violante (2014), among others, for a related analysis. 
35See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2015), among others, for a related analysis. 
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that series of models does not consider mortgage default and household 
bankruptcy. 
 
If both the default and endogenous house price dynamics are important for 
our understanding of the housing market, it is natural to conjecture that combining 
both features will produce a very robust analysis.36 It should be noted that even 
with the exogenous house price process, models with default and bankruptcy are 
typically difficult to solve. Thus, introducing endogenous house prices makes the 
task even more difficult. There are a few papers that have taken up this challenge. 
For instance, Favilukis et al. (2017) consider an overlapping generation model in 
which agents are subject to both idiosyncratic and aggregate risks on the one hand 
and have limited access of instruments that can diversify those risks on the other 
hand. Thus, a distribution of (ex-post) heterogeneous households will be 
generated even if the agents were identical ex-ante. However, the agents are also 
heterogeneous ex-ante. In Favilukis et al.’s (2017) model, a small fraction of 
agents receives a bequest from their parents and makes a bequest to their offspring. 
At the same time, most agents start with little wealth when they start to work, 
which creates a non-trivial wealth distribution in the model. In addition, there are 
participation costs for the equity market, transaction costs for the housing market, 
and borrowing costs, which have important implications for asset markets. For 
instance, when the economy is hit by an adverse aggregate shock, some agents 
who have (relatively) lower levels of income and wealth may choose not to 
participate in asset markets, leaving the relatively rich to actively participate in 
these markets.37 If the aggregate shock turns favorable, then those who held 
                                                       
36See Foote and Willen (2017), among others, for a related discussion. 
37This result is well known. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Stokey (2009), among others. 
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assets during the downturn capture a bigger share of the capital gains. In other 
words, with positive asset market participation costs, the distributional dynamics 
of income and wealth and the dynamics of asset prices can interact in a non-trivial 
manner. In fact, the model can then simultaneously match some macro-stylized 
facts, life-cycle age-income profiles, and asset returns reasonably well. 
 
While credit market conditions and beliefs are often cited as the driving 
forces behind the Great Recession, their relative importance is still not known. 
Kaplan et al. (2017) address this question by building a dynamic general 
equilibrium model with three different types of aggregate shocks. The first type 
of shock is the traditional shock on aggregate labor productivity. The second type 
of shock, which is significant, impacts a group of parameters that capture credit 
market conditions, including the maximum LTV ratio at mortgage origination, 
the maximum payment-to-income (PTI) level, mortgage origination cost, and so 
on. The third type of shock is related to a clever formulation of the aggregate 
preference for housing ߶. In their model, ߶ evolves stochastically and follows 
a three-state Markov process, ߶ ∈ ሼ߶௅∗, ߶௅, ߶ுሽ , where ߶௅∗ ൌ ߶௅ ൏ ߶ு . Thus, 
the preference for housing in the periods are the same when the economy is in the 
state of ߶௅∗, ߶௅ . On the other hand, the two states differ in terms of the 
(conditional) probability of transferring to the state of ߶ு , where a higher 
preference weight is put on housing. Kaplan et al. (2017) therefore distinguish 
the news shock or belief shock (which is a transition between ߶௅∗ and ߶௅) from 
an actual preference shock (which is a transition between ߶௅∗ or ߶௅ and ߶ு).  
 
There are other important assumptions in Kaplan et al. (2017). For instance, 
they assume that renters cannot borrow as they do not have collateral. However, 
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homeowners can use their houses as collateral and borrow through a home equity 
line of credit (HELOC). HELOC is refinanced on a period-by-period basis and 
hence the amount of borrowing is affected by the time-varying house value. It is 
clearly very different from a mortgage loan, where the amount of borrowing is 
affected by the house value during the origination period only. They carefully 
calibrate their model to match both cross-sectional and time-series facts related 
to the housing market.38 In addition, they perform a series of counterfactual 
experiments to disentangle different effects including (1) households belief in 
housing demand remain fixed over time, (2) households believe that they 
themselves will increase the demand for housing in the future, and at the same 
time believe that others will not, (3) mortgage lenders believe that households 
will increase their demand for housing in the future, while rental firms and 
households do not, (4) mortgage lenders are pessimistic about the chance of 
households increasing their housing demands, while the rental firms and 
households are in fact subject to the belief shock, and so on. They find that it is 
indeed important to include the rental sector, and it is the belief shock rather than 
taste shock (the actual change in preference parameters) that accounts for the 
observed boom-bust dynamics. Contrary to some earlier studies, Kaplan et al. 
(2017) find that the relaxation and subsequent tightening of the credit market 
conditions are relatively minor in explaining the observed boom and bust in 
consumption and house prices. In Kaplan et al. (2017), the belief change is 
exogenous. The authors study endogenous belief dynamics in an environment 
                                                       
38As a matter of fact, the “stylized facts” related to the Great Recession are evolving over time, as more data 
become available and more research efforts are being devoted. See Agarwal et al. (2017), Foote et al. (2008, 2016), 
Foote and Willen (2017), Gerardi et al. (2008, 2015a, b), Mian and Sufi (2015, 2016), Palmer (2015), among 
others, and the references therein.  
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with informational frictions. We will discuss some of their contributions in the 
next section.  
 
  3.2. Search and Belief. 
 
The application of the search-and-bargaining theory in housing market 
research has been widely recognized. For instance, according to the Nobel 
Committee (2010), “…This year’s three Laureates have formulated a theoretical 
framework for search markets. Peter Diamond has analyzed the foundations of 
search markets. Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides have expanded the 
theory and have applied it to the labor market.… Search theory has been applied 
to many other areas in addition to the labor market. This includes, in particular, 
the housing market. The number of homes for sale varies over time, as does the 
time it takes for a house to find a buyer and the parties to agree on the price.” 
Clearly, it is impossible to even provide an exhaustive list of that literature.39 
Instead, we focus on a few papers and highlight their insights on the 
macroeconomic aspects of the housing market.40  
 
One of the results of Kaplan et al. (2017) is that belief shocks matter 
considerably. In fact, the importance of beliefs has been discussed in the real 
estate literature, perhaps with different names. 41  The more recent literature 
                                                       
39Wheaton (1990) may be the first paper that adopts a search-and-matching approach (SMA) in an equilibrium 
model to study the house price and vacancy. SMA is then adopted by many authors, including Albrecht et al. 
(2007), Bayer et al. (2011), Díaz and Jerez (2013), Halket and Pignatti Morano di Custoza (2015), Halket and 
Vasudev (2014), Hort (2000), Huang et al. (2017), Krainer (2001), Head and Lloyd-Ellis (2012), Head et al. (2014, 
2018), Ngai and Tenrevro (2014), among others. The mathematical foundation of the search-and-matching models 
has been studied by Duffie and Sun (2012), among others. 
40The related literature uses partial equilibrium search models to analyze the housing market. Again, the literature 
is too vast to be reviewed here. See Anglin and Gao (2011), Arnott (1989), Deng et al. (2012), Leung et al. (2006), 
Leung and Zhang (2011), Lin and Vendall (2007), Yavas (1992), among others, and the references therein.  
41 The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Case and Shiller (1988, 2003), among others, and the 
references therein.  
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embeds “beliefs” in a general equilibrium search model so that we can 
quantitatively study its impact. For instance, Piazzesi and Schneider (2009) show 
that in a simple house search model, a small number of “optimistic” buyers in the 
economy can drive up housing prices because in a search environment, prices are 
determined in a bilateral trade. Optimistic buyers, although a small fraction in the 
economy, can arise endogenously as a large fraction of “active traders,” and hence 
are able to exert a large impact on the market price. The result is clearly in sharp 
contrast with the results reported in Kaplan et al. (2017), where “belief shock” 
needs to impact virtually all agents to generate a significant increase in housing 
prices. While the setup of the two models are very different and hence not trivial 
to compare, it is crucial to note that in Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), the housing 
market is decentralized and subject to search frictions while in Kaplan et al. 
(2017), the housing market is centralized and cleared in every period.  
 
Burnside et al. (2016) also explore the possibility of a small number of 
“optimists” that would affect the whole market through “social dynamics,” 
meaning that the “beliefs” of some economic agents could change when they 
meet others with different beliefs in a stochastic manner. Thus, a model with 
heterogeneous expectation is needed. Guided by the psychology literature, 
Burnside et al. (2016) assume that when two agents meet randomly, the agent 
who has less uncertainty about the fundamental of the housing market, measured 
by the entropy, would not be convinced by the agent who has more. However, the 
probability that an agent with high uncertainty is a decreasing function of the 
difference of the ratio of the uncertainty of the two agents that, other things being 
equal, agents are more likely to be changed by people with relatively similar 
beliefs than by people with very different beliefs.  
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Given these assumptions, the authors show that although initially there is 
only a small fraction of “skeptical” and “optimistic” agents, and most of the 
population is, therefore, “vulnerable,” i.e., they are the ones who are most likely 
to change their beliefs, it is possible that the number of optimistic agents will rise 
and then fall as long as this uncertainty is not resolved. In one of the cases they 
consider, “skeptical” agents are the least likely to change, followed by the 
“optimistic” and “vulnerable” agents, who are most likely to change. Here, when 
an optimistic agent meets a skeptical agent, it is possible for the optimistic agent 
to be “converted” into a skeptical agent. However, when an optimistic agent 
meets a vulnerable agent, the former will remain optimistic and the latter may be 
converted into an optimistic agent. In a world of random matching, and the initial 
amount of skeptical and optimistic agents being equally small, the chance of an 
optimistic agent of “converting” a vulnerable agent is much higher than the 
chance of him/her being “converted” by a skeptical agent. Hence, the population 
of optimistic agents is expected to grow. The population of skeptical agents will 
grow as well because whether they meet an optimistic agent or a vulnerable agent, 
they could “convert” them into skeptical agents. However, as the beliefs of 
skeptical agents are so different from those of the vulnerable majority, the growth 
rate of skeptical agents is slower than that of optimistic agents within certain 
parameter values. At some point, however, the relative population of optimistic 
agents becomes so large that the chance for them of meeting skeptical agents is 
higher than that of meeting vulnerable agents. The net growth of optimistic agents 
then becomes negative.  
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The rise and subsequent fall of the proportion of optimistic agents also leads 
to a boom-bust cycle of housing prices, as they, unlike the other types of agents, 
believe that housing will deliver a higher value of utility in the future. Burnside 
et al. (2016) demonstrate the basic mechanism with a simple model and then show 
that the intuition carries to a model with 12 different types of agents, who may 
differ in terms of their beliefs or their housing market participation. They calibrate 
their models and match some facts of the housing market. 
 
While the previously mentioned papers are based on a random search, 
Hedlund (2016a, b) explores a model using a directed search.42 In particular, 
Hedlund assumes that all transactions are intermediated by brokers. Hence, 
buyers buy from brokers and sellers sell to brokers. Modifying the “search 
activities” enables the model to consider a more complicated form of mortgage 
contracts than many search-theoretic models of housing.43 In Hedlund’s model, 
the pace of amortization is flexible and hence borrowers can slow down the speed 
of repayment when needed. However, homeowners can extract home equity only 
by paying off the original mortgage contract first and then originating a new 
mortgage contract. 44  There are two issues to consider here. First, the 
homeowners who need to extract home equity may not have enough liquid assets 
to pay off the original mortgage contract. Second, even if they are willing to 
borrow, banks may not be willing to lend. In the model, banks need to pay for 
both the mortgage origination cost (which functions like a “fixed cost”) as well 
as serving cost to maintain a mortgage cost (which functions like a “variable 
                                                       
42It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the expanding literature on directed searching. See Wright et al. 
(2017), among others, for a review of the literature. 
43See also Eerola and Maattanen (2018) and Head et al. (2018).  
44See Laufer (2018), among others, and the references therein for the effect of equity extraction on the subsequent 
default probability. 
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cost”). Thus, banks may not want to originate a new mortgage contract in certain 
situations.  
 
Equipped with this setup and through careful calibration, Hedlund mimics 
the stylized fact that leverage, selling price, and time-on-the-market (TOM) are 
correlated. 45  The intuition is straightforward. When a homeowner needs to 
smooth out his/her consumption, he/she can either sell his/her liquid assets, 
extract home equity, or simply sell his/her house. When the number of liquid 
assets decreases, he/she may be tempted to extract the home equity. However, the 
bank may not want to originate a new mortgage contract for such needy 
homeowners. In this case, the homeowner will be forced to sell his/her house. 
Thus, homeowners with little liquid assets, so-called distressed owners, may be 
forced to launch a “fire sale.” However, those who are highly leveraged may not 
even be able to do that because they do not have enough liquid assets to make up 
the difference between the selling price and the outstanding mortgage loan. 
Therefore, those distressed owners who are also highly leveraged will be forced 
to post high selling prices. Undoubtedly, other things being equal, high selling 
prices will lead to a longer TOM, which further increases the opportunity for 
foreclosure. Hedlund (2016a, b) articulates this intuition with a cleverly designed 
directed search model of the housing market. 
 
Thus far, we have seen two extreme forms of house searching, namely, either 
completely random (such as the case of Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Burnside 
et al. 2016) or completely directed (such as the case of Hedlund), in which no 
                                                       
45Prior research explains the correlation by using behavioral economics such as the preference of loss aversion 
(for instance, see Genesove and Mayer, 1997, 2001). Some recent research, however, has cast doubts on the 
importance of loss aversion (for instance, see Easley and Yang, 2015 and Li et al. 2017). 
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seller sells to an end-user directly. While these models succeed with respect to 
many dimensions, the fluctuations in terms of trading volume seem to have been 
overlooked. For instance, in Figure 5 and 6 of Burnside et al. (2016), we notice 
that the transaction volume (which is also the turnover rate, as the total supply of 
housing stock is fixed in their model) can deviate up to 20% from the steady-state 
value. Some studies are relatively silent on the turnover rate. Figure 1 represents 
the real house price and the turnover rate in the United States.46 To facilitate 
comparison, we normalize both series to 100 at the beginning of the period. It is 
clear that turnover rate fluctuates significantly more than the house price. Even at 
the aggregate level, the turnover rate at its peak can be double of its own trough. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Some attribute the volatile turnover to “speculative activities.” Leung and 
Tse (2017) consider an intermediate case by introducing the (endogenous) 
participation of “flippers” (or “speculators,” or “investors,” which are used 
interchangeably in their work). In their model, a homeowner may receive a 
“separation shock” (as the “job separation shock” in the Mortensen-Pissarides 
model), after which he/she can choose to sell the house to a flipper, which is 
immediate, and move to a rental housing unit or become a buyer and search for 
another for-sale housing unit. Alternatively, he/she can wait for a buyer to visit. 
Hence, the model endogenizes the extent of intermediated trade in the housing 
                                                       
46Our real housing price is defined as the nominal house price, which is the transaction-based house price index 
from OFHEO (http://www.fhfa.gov) divided by the CPI from the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis. Transaction 
is measured by the quarterly sales in single-family homes, apartment condos, and co-ops, normed by the stock of 
such units. The sales data are from the Real Estate Outlook by the National Association of Realtors, complied by 
Moody’s Analytics. The housing stock is defined as the sum of owner-occupied units and vacant for-sale-only 
units. The data are from the Bureau of Census's CPS/HVS Series H-111 available at 
http://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/data/histtabs.html. 
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market and embeds two extreme cases: (1) buyers and sellers meet randomly and 
no trade is intermediated, and (2) all trade is intermediated (as in the case of 
Hedlund). In the model, flippers have the advantage of bargaining (i.e., may get 
a bigger share of the gains from trade than the households) and of inventory (i.e., 
face a lower discount rate while waiting for buyers to come than the households). 
Recall that selling a house to a flipper involves receiving a lower selling price but 
a shorter waiting time (or, a shorter TOM). Thus, it is possible to observe price 
dispersion in equilibrium if some mismatched households sell their houses to 
flippers while others sell to buyers directly. From the household perspective, 
whether to use the flipper to facilitate trade depends on (1) the price differential 
between selling to a flipper versus selling to an end-user and (2) the time 
differential between selling to a flipper (which is assumed to be zero in their 
model) versus selling to an end-user. 47  From the perspective of the flipper, 
however, whether a flipper is willing to “facilitate” a trade depends on whether 
his/her share of gains from trade is large enough, and whether his/her discount 
rate is sufficiently different from the household. Leung and Tse (2017) show both 
analytically and quantitatively that multiple equilibria are possible, meaning that 
for given preferences and technologies, it is possible to have different prices in 
equilibrium, and each price is associated with a different share of flipper 
participation. In their calibration, even without a change in “economic 
fundamentals,” average house price can differ by up to 20%. Moreover, by fixing 
the discount rate of households, the effect of a change in a flipper’s discount rate 
can have a very non-linear effect on the equilibrium price. The intuition is very 
simple to explain. Note that the participation of flippers is endogenous. With a 
slight increase in their discount rate, the participation rate of the flippers may 
                                                       
47See Guren (2016), among others, for more discussion on this point. 
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change slightly as well. However, after reaching some critical values, the 
participation rate of flippers may dramatically drop, and the probability of buying 
and selling will change as well. The resulting equilibrium will look very different. 
 
There are unanswered questions in Leung and Tse (2017). If we can have 
multiple equilibria in the housing market, we would want to know how 
equilibrium is being selected. A natural way to do so is to introduce the formation 
and evolution of beliefs. Thus, a natural extension is to combine a search model 
with beliefs (such as Piazzesi and Schneider, 2009; Burnside et al. 2016) with an 
explicit modeling of flippers (such as Leung and Tse, 2017) and examine both the 
theoretical and empirical implications. There are many opportunities for future 
research in this regard. 
 
 
  3.3. Urban Development and Housing Market  
 
According to United Nations (2016) “Most people can agree that cities are 
places where large numbers of people live and work; they are hubs of government, 
commerce and transportation. But how best to define the geographical limits of a 
city is a matter of some debate. So far, no standardized international criteria exist 
for determining the boundaries of a city and often multiple different boundary 
definitions are available for any given city.” In the economics literature, much 
has been discussed on city formation, the interaction of spatial agglomeration and 
economic development, and related topics. 48  Here, we only highlight a few 
papers, which may encourage more research in this area.  
                                                       
48It is beyond the scope of this paper to review the literature. See Berliant (2010), Berliant et al. (2002), Berliant 
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Most macro-housing papers assume that there is only one housing market, 
and abstract away the spatial and urban considerations.49 Wang and Xie (2014) 
develop a two-sector growth model with explicit spatial considerations. More 
specifically, Wang and Xie assume that the city is a line segment and agents can 
choose their preferred locations. Hence, housing prices can vary across locations 
(i.e., different “points” on the same line segment) in equilibrium. In their model, 
housing depends on the amount of land as well as the physical structure. While 
land does not depreciate, the physical structure does depreciate over time. Hence, 
agents need to invest in structure continuously and consequently to trade off the 
investment in structure (for “housing consumption”) versus investment in 
physical capital (for goods production). They further deviate from the commonly 
used specification in the macro-housing literature in that (1) they assume that 
there is a positive amount of minimum structure, and (2) housing is a luxury good 
in the sense that its income inelasticity differs from that of consumption goods. 
As agents can reallocate themselves freely across locations, the prices must adjust 
in a way that the utility at each location is equalized. Their model can mimic some 
cross-sectional and time series stylized facts. In addition, they show that if instead 
(1) they assume homothetic preference (i.e., housing has the same income 
elasticity as consumption goods), or (2) there is no minimum physical structure, 
then the model would generate counter-factual predictions. In other words, we 
need to assume that (1) housing is a luxurious good and (2) there is a minimum 
physical structure. 
                                                       
and Mori (2017), Berliant and Wang (2008), Berliant and Watanabe (2015), Bond et al. (2016), Duranton (2007), 
Duranton and Puga (2004), Glaeser (2011), Kopecky and Suen (2010), Li (2017), Liao et al. (2017), Lucas and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2002), Schiff (2015), Wang et al. (2017), among others, and the references therein.  
49There are a few exceptions. See Lin et al. (2004), Leung and Teo (2011), among others, and the references 
therein.  
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Clearly, both of these assumptions deviate from the standard macro-housing 
models. Wang and Xie (2014) need these assumptions to be consistent with the 
stylized facts while standard models do not because they impose two realistic 
conditions on the model: (1) the amount of land supply increases with the distance 
from the Central Business District (CBD) and (2) other things being equal, agents 
prefer to live closer to the CBD (Wang and Xie call this a “locational discount”). 
Essentially, Wang and Xie seem to suggest that, if we were to account for both 
cross-sectional and time series facts of housing, we need to reconsider the 
standard macro-housing models.  
 
Recently, Herkenhoff et al. (2017), among others, take the “spatial macro-
housing models” (SMHM) to another level. It is well-known that land-use 
regulations limit housing supply and affect house prices.50 Leung and Teo (2011) 
built one of the first multi-regional, dynamic, general equilibrium models and 
show that their model is qualitatively consistent with several stylized facts. 
However, they do not provide a careful calibration of the regional level data. 
Herkenhoff et al. (2017) aggregate the 48 states of the United States into 8 regions 
and separately model them, thereby allowing parameters to differ across regions. 
They find that if they could de-regulate California and New York back to their 
1980 level of regulation, the “gain” in consumption would be up to 5%, which is 
a very significant number. 
 
                                                       
50The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Glaeser et al. (2005), Green et al. (2005), Saiz (2010), among 
others, and the references therein. 
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While most macro-housing models focus on the U.S. case, there are 
important exceptions. For instance, there is much debate on whether (1) the 
housing market in China is expanding too fast, (2) it could collapse soon, and (3) 
if it indeed collapses, it could exert negative externality on other markets and 
countries.51 Garriga et al. (2017) contribute to the debate by building a dynamic 
model with “rural” and “urban/city” areas. In their model, continuous 
productivity growth in the manufacturing sector plays an important role because 
it widens the productivity gap between the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
It enables city workers to afford more expensive housing over time, and also 
attracts rural workers, who can only work in the agricultural sector, into urban 
areas. Both effects lead to a continuous increase in the relative price of housing. 
The authors calibrate their model carefully and find that they can explain most 
changes in the housing market. Clearly, China is not the only developing country. 
Therefore, there is much room for the application and extension of the studies in 
other developing housing markets. 
 
 
  3.4. Urban Policy and Human Capital 
 
Recent research confirms that human capital is important to economic growth, 
and educational reform has the potential to significantly improve the economic 
growth rate (e.g., Hanushek et al., 2017 a, b; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2015). 
Research has also confirmed that early stage human capital formation (for 
instance, before the age of 10, or even earlier) is crucial to later stage human 
                                                       
51The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Wu et al. (2012, 2016), Deng et al. (2017), Hsu et al. (2017), 
Huang et al. (2015), Leung et al. (2011), Song and Xiong (2018), Yang and Chen (2014), Zhang et al. (2016), 
Zheng and Saiz (2016), among others, and the references therein. 
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capital formation (e.g., Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al. 2010;          
Heckman, 2008). In the United States, the approach to providing local public 
financing of primary and secondary schools naturally binds the local housing 
market and the financing of pre-college education. Hanushek and Yilmaz (2011, 
p.583) summarize it this way, “…In simplest terms, poverty, race and schooling 
are very highly correlated with location…. The reliance on the local tax for a large 
portion of school funding implies that the government grant system has an 
important effect on both locational decisions and educational outcomes… 
Education in the United States is provided by local school districts that operate 
with considerable autonomy. Funding is provided by a combination of local, state, 
and federal revenues with the level of spending and the performance of schools 
varying significantly across school districts….” Thus, it is possible that some 
families who can only afford less desirable neighborhoods raise their offspring in 
those neighborhoods. In turn, the future development of these offspring may be 
constrained and adversely affected, and hence result in cross-sectional 
segregation and intergenerational immobility. Benabou (1993, 1996a, b), Durlauf 
(1996), among others, explore such related theoretical possibilities. Empirically, 
however, this seems to be controversial and many authors have contributed to this 
literature.52 Here, we only highlight a few contributions and hopefully encourage 
even more research on this literature. For instance, Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007, 
2013) build a static general equilibrium model, which allows for endogenous 
community choice (according to Tiebout) and spatial locational choice (according 
to Alonso).53 They calibrate the model to match some stylized facts of the United 
                                                       
52The literature is too vast to be reviewed here. See Bayer et al. (2007), Brasington and Haurin (2009), Epple and 
Nechyba (2004), Nechyba (2006), Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger (2011), among others, and the references therein. 
More recently, Chetty and Hendren (2017a, b) confirm with their large administrative dataset that the 
neighborhood that children grow up in does have an impact on subsequent economic outcomes. 
53In Hanushek and Yilmaz, neighborhoods are identical ex-ante. Other authors study the case when 
neighborhoods are different ex-ante (for instance, downtown versus suburban). See de Bartolome and Ross 
40 
 
States. Based on the calibrated parameters, they point out that the manner in 
which education is financed matters. Hanushek et al. (2011) introduce private 
schools in that framework and find that private schools can indeed improve the 
welfare of all types of agents. Leung et al. (2012) consider public housing versus 
housing vouchers in the Hanushek-Yilmaz model. They find that although there 
are different forms of market imperfections in the model, the conventional 
wisdom, namely, distributing cash is better than distributing public housing units, 
prevails. Hanushek and Yilmaz (2015) find that the zoning policy affects both 
education and the housing market. Bayer et al. (2016), however, estimate a 
dynamic, partial equilibrium model. They assume that the per-period utility 
function is somehow additively separable. Their dynamic estimates suggest that 
some prior estimates that are based on static demand functions of non-market 
amenities may be significantly biased. Given all of these calibrations and 
estimations, one may still wonder whether, or under what conditions, an urban 
policy (such as public housing or affordable housing policy) or an education 
finance reform (such as school finance consolidation) would necessarily improve 
the welfare and promote the accumulation of human capital and economic 
growth.54 Clearly, much more work is needed in this area. 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
To most households, housing is the most important form of asset holding that 
they can manage on their own (a retirement fund is clearly important as well but 
is typically subject to different constraints before retirement). Recently, the 
                                                       
(2003), among others, and the references therein. 
54For more discussion, see Disney and Luo (2017), Favilukis et al. (2018), among others, and the references therein. 
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importance of housing has been increasingly recognized in economics and 
finance. This paper achieves two objectives. First, we re-examine the “stylized 
facts” of macro-housing. With respect to the business cycle frequency, we find 
that in many cases, the correlations between traditional MV and HMV have 
weakened following the GFC. However, the correlations between macro-finance 
variables and HMV have strengthened following the GFC. In the medium-cycle 
frequency, some correlations display the same change as in the business cycle 
frequency while others do not. Therefore, we urge researchers to pay more 
attention to the “stylized facts” in macro-housing research. 
 
Our second objective is to review some of the literature. We highlight some 
contributions from important topics: mortgage and bankruptcies, search and 
beliefs, urban development and housing market, and urban policy and human 
capital. We find that substantial progress has been made, and at the same time, 
there remain open questions in these areas. Clearly, many important papers and 
research areas have been overlooked. We can only allow for such “recognition 
deficit” for the moment and hope for a more elaborate survey in the future. 
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Appendix 
 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that with a change in variance over time, the 
measured correlation may be biased. We therefore follow Stock and Watson 
(2002) to standardize the variance. Our procedure is given below. 
 
Step one. We first use the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter to extract the business 
cycle components in the PCSS. By construction, the extracted time series is 
stationary and hence moments are well defined. Let ሼݔ௧ሽ be such a time series. 
The correspondence variance of ሼݔ௧ሽ is denoted by by ߪ௫ଶ. We then  
“standardize” the volatility of all variables. Now a new variable ݖ௧ ൌ ௫೟ఙೣ is 
defined. Hence, ݒܽݎሺݖ௧ሻ ൌ ݒܽݎሺݔ௧/ߪ௫ሻ ൌ ݒܽݎሺݔ௧ሻ/ሺߪ௫ଶሻ ൌ 1. We apply this 
data transformation to all variables and hence all variables have the same 
volatility. We can then compute all of the needed correlations. 
 
Step two. We repeat the same procedure on the full sample. Note that even for 
the same variable ݔ௧, for instance GDP, the sampling period is now different 
and hence the variance of the extracted series may also be different. A 
potentially different transformed variable ሼݖ′௧ሽ will be generated. We apply the 
procedure to all variables and then re-compute all of the needed correlations. 
 
Step three. We repeat both step one and step two, only this time we extract the 
medium-cycle components instead of the business cycle components. We 
calculate and tabulate all of the needed correlations. 
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Table 1 Correlation between the cyclical component of housing and macro-variables (Panel A) 
 
      Housing variables  
        at time t 
Macro-variables 
 
Real “purchase-only” house 
price index 
New house sold Vacancy rate of for-sale 
housing 
Real private residential fixed 
investment 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
Real GDP t-1 0.77*** 0.57*** 0.24* 0.14 -0.39*** -0.03 0.65*** 0.54*** 
t 0.78*** 0.66*** 0.42*** 0.34*** -0.44*** -0.10 0.76*** 0.68*** 
t+1 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.58*** 0.51*** -0.52*** -0.16 0.83*** 0.76*** 
Unemployment 
rate 
t-1 -0.67*** -0.27*** 0.18 0.27*** -0.12 -0.28*** -0.29** -0.12 
t -0.76*** -0.43*** -0.01 0.09 0.08 -0.20** -0.48*** -0.32*** 
t+1 -0.81*** -0.59*** -0.21 -0.13 0.33*** -0.09 -0.64*** -0.51*** 
CPI t-1 0.18 -0.12 -0.47*** -0.37*** 0.39*** 0.19** -0.22* -0.21** 
t 0.30** 0.00 -0.33*** -0.24** 0.14 0.13 -0.05 -0.06 
t+1 0.46*** 0.19* -0.18 -0.10 -0.07 0.06 0.13 0.11 
Real private 
Nonresidential 
Fixed Investment 
t-1 0.71*** 0.31*** -0.04 -0.22** -0.03 0.18* 0.39*** 0.15 
t 0.78*** 0.45*** 0.14 -0.04 -0.18 0.12 0.55*** 0.33*** 
t+1 0.81*** 0.58*** 0.31** 0.16 -0.38*** 0.03 0.69*** 0.51*** 
Real personal 
consumption 
expenditures 
t-1 0.66*** 0.41*** 0.02 0.06 -0.25** 0.02 0.45*** 0.41*** 
t 0.72*** 0.52*** 0.20 0.22*** -0.33*** -0.03 0.60*** 0.55*** 
t+1 0.73*** 0.58*** 0.37*** 0.37*** -0.43*** -0.08 0.70*** 0.65*** 
Real trade 
surplus 
t-1 -0.77*** -0.30*** -0.17 -0.10 0.25** 0.00 -0.58*** -0.45*** 
t -0.78*** -0.39*** -0.34*** -0.27*** 0.47*** 0.11 -0.72*** -0.59*** 
t+1 -0.77*** -0.48*** -0.50*** -0.44*** 0.69*** 0.23** -0.82*** -0.69*** 
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Table 1 Correlation between the cyclical component of housing and macro-variables (Panel B) 
 
      Housing variables  
        at time t 
Macro-variables 
 
Real “purchase-only” house 
price index 
New house sold Vacancy rate of for-sale 
housing 
Real private residential fixed 
investment 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
Nominal federal 
funds rate 
t-1 0.54*** 0.56*** 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.23** 0.27** 0.33*** 
t 0.61*** 0.64*** 0.08 0.18* 0.01 0.08 0.38*** 0.47*** 
t+1 0.64*** 0.69*** 0.17 0.29*** -0.19 -0.07 0.50*** 0.59*** 
Real federal 
funds rate 
t-1 0.48*** 0.63*** -0.28** -0.06 0.35*** 0.23** 0.06 0.13 
t 0.62*** 0.65*** -0.16 0.01 0.22* 0.08 0.24* 0.22** 
t+1 0.66*** 0.55*** -0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.39*** 0.30*** 
Term spread t-1 -0.64*** -0.62*** -0.10 -0.20** -0.08 -0.07 -0.36*** -0.44*** 
t -0.69*** -0.64*** -0.19 -0.32*** 0.15 0.11 -0.46*** -0.55*** 
t+1 -0.68*** -0.61*** -0.27** -0.40*** 0.42*** 0.28*** -0.55*** -0.65*** 
TED spread t-1 -0.11 -0.43*** -0.39*** -0.45*** -0.08 -0.01 -0.22* -0.37*** 
t -0.11 -0.36*** -0.33*** -0.43*** -0.15 0.11 -0.19 -0.28*** 
t+1 -0.03 -0.21** -0.28 -0.35*** -0.12 0.21** -0.14 -0.17* 
External finance 
premium 
t-1 -0.38*** -0.42*** -0.33*** -0.29*** 0.34*** -0.06 -0.48*** -0.45*** 
t -0.30** -0.52*** -0.37*** -0.41*** 0.47*** 0.12 -0.49*** -0.49*** 
t+1 -0.21 -0.57*** -0.44*** -0.50*** 0.65*** 0.31*** -0.49*** -0.49*** 
S&P 500 index 
(real terms) 
t-1 0.74*** 0.57*** 0.43*** 0.22** -0.49*** -0.04 0.73*** 0.55*** 
t 0.70*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.41*** -0.80*** -0.12 0.78*** 0.66*** 
t+1 0.62*** 0.74*** 0.64*** 0.55*** -0.53*** -0.20** 0.78*** 0.72*** 
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Notes: 
1. Sources of data: “purchase-only” house price index: Federal Housing Finance Agency; vacancy rate of for-sale housing, and new house sold: U.S. Bureau of the Census; 
private residential Fixed Investment, personal consumption expenditures, GDP and trade surplus: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; CPI: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; 
term spread: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; effective federal funds rate: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; External finance premium: corporate 
bond spread (Baa-Aaa): Moody's. 
2. Term spread is the difference between 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity and 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity. TED spread is the difference between the Eurodollar 
deposit rate and the T-bill rate (both are 3-month). External finance premium is the corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa). 
3. All the variables are seasonal adjusted. Real variables are nominal variables are deflated by CPI. 
4. Cyclical components are obtained by using Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) band pass filter. Ng and Perron (2001) unit root test indicates that all the variables are I(1) 
except the nominal effective federal funds rate and the external finance premium: corporate bond spread (Baa-Aaa) which are I(0). 
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Table 2 Correlation between the medium cycle component of housing and macro-variables (Panel A) 
 
      Housing variables  
        at time t 
Macro-variables 
 
Real “purchase-only” house 
price index 
New house sold Vacancy rate of for-sale 
housing 
Real private residential fixed 
investment 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
Real GDP t-1 0.57*** 0.81*** 0.61*** 0.73*** -0.11 -0.14 0.62*** 0.80*** 
t 0.58*** 0.79*** 0.65*** 0.79*** -0.16 -0.24*** 0.65*** 0.83*** 
t+1 0.56*** 0.75*** 0.68*** 0.83*** -0.26** -0.34*** 0.67*** 0.85*** 
Unemployment 
rate 
t-1 -0.34*** -0.69*** -0.35*** -0.67*** -0.12 0.14 -0.38*** -0.72*** 
t -0.36*** -0.67*** -0.41*** -0.72*** -0.07 0.24*** -0.43*** -0.76*** 
t+1 -0.35*** -0.63*** -0.45*** -0.76*** 0.01 0.33*** -0.46*** -0.77*** 
CPI t-1 -0.57*** -0.29*** -0.53*** -0.24*** 0.56*** 0.25*** -0.49*** -0.20** 
t -0.53*** -0.26*** -0.49*** -0.20** 0.55*** 0.22** -0.44*** -0.15 
t+1 -0.50*** -0.23** -0.46*** -0.17* 0.58*** 0.22** -0.40*** -0.13 
Real private 
Nonresidential 
Fixed Investment 
t-1 -0.32*** 0.21** -0.25** 0.26*** 0.26** -0.05 -0.27** 0.28*** 
t -0.30** 0.20** -0.23* 0.29*** 0.28** -0.09 -0.24* 0.31*** 
t+1 -0.30** 0.18* -0.21* 0.32*** 0.30** -0.13 -0.21* 0.33*** 
Real personal 
consumption 
expenditures 
t-1 0.72*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.78*** -0.38*** -0.19** 0.78*** 0.83*** 
t 0.70*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.83*** -0.42*** -0.29*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 
t+1 0.67*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.86*** -0.51*** -0.38*** 0.77*** 0.88*** 
Real trade 
surplus 
t-1 -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.94*** -0.84*** 0.39*** 0.17* -0.96*** -0.90*** 
t -0.97*** -0.96*** -0.95*** -0.88*** 0.46*** 0.28*** -0.96*** -0.92*** 
t+1 -0.95*** -0.93*** -0.96*** -0.92*** 0.59*** 0.38*** -0.95*** -0.93*** 
Notes: Our definition of “medium cycles” follow Comin and Gertler (2006), which captures the components with periodicity between 32 and 80 quarters. 
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Table 2 Correlation between the medium cycle component of housing and macro-variables (Panel B) 
 
      Housing variables  
        at time t 
Macro-variables 
 
Real “purchase-only” house 
price index 
New house sold Vacancy rate of for-sale 
housing 
Real private residential fixed 
investment 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
1991Q1-
2006Q4 
1991Q1-
2017Q3 
Nominal federal 
funds rate 
t-1 -0.26** 0.17* -0.49*** -0.19** 0.93*** 0.70*** -0.34*** -0.03 
t -0.14 0.25*** -0.37*** -0.08 0.89*** 0.64*** -0.22* 0.08 
t+1 -0.05 0.33*** -0.28** 0.02 0.84*** 0.57*** -0.12 0.18* 
Real federal 
funds rate 
t-1 -0.47*** 0 -0.57*** -0.27*** 0.78*** 0.63*** -0.48*** -0.15 
t -0.38*** 0.07 -0.48*** -0.17* 0.78*** 0.59*** -0.38*** -0.05 
t+1 -0.32*** 0.14 -0.41*** -0.08 0.77*** 0.54*** -0.31** 0.04 
Term spread t-1 0.27** -0.18* 0.31*** 0 -0.60*** -0.42*** 0.25** -0.10 
t 0.20 -0.22** 0.23* -0.09 -0.58*** -0.35*** 0.17 -0.18* 
t+1 0.17 -0.25*** 0.17 -0.16* -0.55*** -0.30*** 0.10 -0.25*** 
TED spread t-1 -0.45*** -0.02 -0.59*** -0.43*** 0.75*** 0.80*** -0.53*** -0.30*** 
t -0.35*** 0.08 -0.51*** -0.32*** 0.79*** 0.78*** -0.42*** -0.19* 
t+1 -0.31** 0.16* -0.43*** -0.22** 0.79*** 0.75*** -0.34*** -0.08 
External finance 
premium 
t-1 -0.39*** -0.48*** -0.58*** -0.68*** 0.30** 0.38*** -0.54*** -0.65*** 
t -0.35*** -0.43*** -0.58*** -0.68*** 0.36*** 0.45*** -0.53*** -0.63*** 
t+1 -0.32*** -0.38*** -0.58*** -0.67*** 0.44*** 0.52*** -0.52*** -0.61*** 
S&P 500 index 
(real terms) 
t-1 -0.36*** 0.12 -0.23* 0.25*** -0.03 -0.25*** -0.31*** 0.23** 
t -0.39*** 0.09 -0.25** 0.26*** 0.03 -0.26*** -0.32*** 0.23** 
t+1 -0.42*** 0.05 -0.27** 0.25*** 0.09 -0.27*** -0.33*** 0.22** 
Notes: Our definition of “medium cycles” follow Comin and Gertler (2006), which captures the components with periodicity between 32 and 80 quarters.  
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Figure 1: USA House Price and Turnover Rate 
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